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Abstract
We describe a duopoly model where stockholders assess the relative pro…tability of
delegation versus process innovation. Delegation may not be a dominant strategy.
When it is, the game is not necessarily a prisoners’ dilemma. Our model yields
several equilibria where at least one …rm remains entrepreneurial and …nds it
preferable to undertake cost-reducing R&D activities. Then, we introduce the
possibility of using delegation and cost-reducing R&D jointly. The use of R&D
investment by entrepreneurial …rms is a dominated strategy, so that …rms always
separate ownership from control, while they don’t necessarily combine delegation
with process innovation.
J.E.L. Classi…cation Numbers: D43, L13, O31
Keywords: Cournot behaviour, delegation, cost-reducing R&D
1 Introduction
Recent literature on oligopolistic interaction has treated separately two relevant
issues, namely, (i) the incentive to separate ownership and control through del-
egation of the output or price decision to managers; and (ii) the incentive for
pro…t-seeking …rms to activate R&D investments aimed at process or product
innovation under either Bertrand or Cournot behaviour. Both approaches can be
thought of as modelling cost-reducing activities, which respectively translate into
an e¤ective reduction of marginal cost in the case of R&D, or into a perceived
reduction in the case of delegation. Our aim is to model the stockholders’ choice
between R&D and delegation in a Cournot model.
As to the interplay between market competition and the internal organization
of the …rm, several contributions show that, in order to acquire the Stackelberg
leader’s position in the product market, …rms’ stockholders delegate the control
over the marketing behaviour of …rms to managers1 interested in maximizing an
objective function consisting in a weighted sum of pro…ts and sales (Fershtman,
1985; Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987; Fershtman et
al., 1991; Polo and Tedeschi, 1992; Barcena-Ruiz and Paz Espinoza, 1996; 1999;
Lambertini, 2000a,b). In the Cournot equilibrium, all …rms delegate control to
managers in order to try and achieve a dominant position.2 Each …rm would
prefer the rivals not to delegate, the equilibrium being a¤ected by a prisoner’s
dilemma (Vickers, 1985). Basu (1995) extends the basic model to describe the
owner’s decision to hire a manager in a Cournot duopoly. He shows that a
Stackelberg equilibrium may arise, with just one …rm delegating, even though
the cost of hiring an agent is the same across owners.
1An alternative justi…cation for the use of delegation is given by Zábojník (1998). Share-
holders may …nd it optimal to provide managers with incentives to maximise sales in addition
to pro…ts if a double agency problem exists. In this case, the compensation contract not only af-
fects executive’s market decisions, but also provides a remedy to the underinvestment in human
capital by workers.
2The incentive to hire managers not aligned with the owners’ objectives may also derive
from the owners’ attempt at stabilising collusion (Lambertini and Trombetta, 2000).
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As to the R&D behaviour of pro…t-seeking agents, Brander and Spencer (1983)
and Dixon (1985) investigate the Cournot setting and Bertrand setting, respec-
tively, …nding that …rms overinvest (respectively, underinvest) in cost-reducing
R&D as compared to cost minimization if downstream competition takes place
in quantities (prices).
We merge these two streams of literature in a single model where stockhold-
ers are assumed to evaluate the relative pro…tability of delegation versus process
innovation. First, we investigate a game where delegation and R&D activity are
alternative (i.e., mutually exclusive) strategies. This simple perspective enables
us to produce equilibria where delegation is no longer a dominant strategy, and,
whenever it is a dominant strategy, the associated equilibrium is not necessarily
the outcome of a prisoners’ dilemma. That is, our model yields several equilibria
where at least one …rm remains entrepreneurial and …nds it preferable to under-
take cost-reducing R&D activities. Hence, in general, we may expect that the
strategic advantage generated by separation between ownership and control may
be more than o¤set by other strategies leading to output expansion or equiva-
lently to an increase in the market share of the …rm adopting such alternative
strategies.
Then, we consider a more realistic game where R&D and delegation can be
combined so as to activate cost-reducing investments in a managerial …rm. The
main …ndings are that, in such a game, (i) the investment in cost-reducing R&D
by entrepreneurial …rms is a strictly dominated strategy; accordingly, it is never
observed in equilibrium; (ii) …rms always delegate control to managers, although
they may not always undertake R&D investments, i.e., (iii) the joint use of dele-
gation an R&D for process innovation is not necessarily an equilibrium strategy,
due to the fact that the R&D investment may be too expensive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic setting. Section 3 deals with market subgames, given the stockhold-
ers’ decision at the …rst stage. Section 4 illustrates the equilibrium analysis of
the stockholders’ game where either (i) delegation and R&D are mutually exclu-
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sive, or (ii) stockholders can combine delegation and cost-reducing investments.
Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 The model
We adopt the same setup as in Vickers (1985). Two symmetric …rms compete
on a market for homogeneous products, supplying one good each. The inverse
demand function is
p = A¡Q ; Q = q1 + q2 (1)
In the remainder, we model the following story. Competition takes place in
two stages. In the …rst, stockholders decide whether to delegated control to
managers or to invest in cost-reducing R&D, or combine the two strategies. In
the second stage, …rms optimise simultaneously w.r.t. output levels, given the
choices taken at the previous stage. This means that stockholders directly control
output decisions if they have not delegated control to managers, while managers
control the marketing behaviour in the opposite case where stockholders have
delegated control to them (and may or may not have decided to invest in cost-
reducing R&D).
We assume …rms initially operate with the same technology, characterized by
a constant marginal production cost c, which a …rm may reduce to bc 2 [0; c) by
investing in R&D an amount of resources equal to k: Firm i’s pro…ts are:
¼i =
8><>:(p¡ c) qi if the …rm does not invest(p¡ bc) qi ¡ k if the …rm does invest (2)
In the remainder, we assume that the development cost k is su¢ciently low to
ensure positive pro…ts to the …rm undertaking the R&D activity, irrespective of
whether the rival …rm adopts the same strategy or instead separates ownership
from control or adopts both strategies jointly.
Alternative or in addition to the R&D activity, …rms’ stockholders may decide
to delegate control to managers who are not interested in pro…t maximization as
such, as they own no share, but rather in sales, so that in case of managerialization
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…rm i ’s maximand at the market stage modi…es as follows:3
Mi = ¼i + µiqi; (3)
where parameter µi identi…es the weight attached to the volume of sales, and is
optimally set by the stockholder in the employment contract, in order to maximize
pro…ts (Vickers, 1985). Parameter µi is assumed to be observable.4 Managerial
remuneration is a two-part wage, where a component is exogenously …xed and the
other is increasing in output (see Fershtman and Judd, 1987; and Basu, 1995).
In order to characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage
game, we proceed by backward induction, solving …rst the market subgames
given the decision taken by stockholders at the …rst stage. This is done in the
following section.
3 Stage II: Market subgames
The symmetric subgames where both …rms are either entrepreneurial (i.e., pure
pro…t-seeking units) or managerial, can be quickly dealt with.
Consider …rst the setting where Cournot competition takes place between
pro…t maximizers operating at marginal cost bc: In this case, pro…ts amount to:
¼N (k; k) =
(A¡ bc)2
9
¡ k (4)
for both …rms. Superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium.
Now examine the setting where both …rms keep the initial (symmetric) tech-
nology unaltered, and delegate control to managers operating the output decision
with a marginal cost equal to c: In such a case, symmetric equilibrium pro…ts are:
¼N (µ; µ) =
2 (A¡ c)2
25
; (5)
3Considering a linear contract only is restrictive, but this assumption is adopted for the sake
of comparability with most of the existing literature.
4As shown by Katz (1991), if contracts were unobservable then delegation would have no
e¤ect on the equilibrium of the game, i.e., it would be the same as in the game without agents.
See, in particular, Corollary 1 (Katz, 1991, p. 315). See also Barcena-Ruiz and Paz Espinoza
(1996, p. 348). For a general approach to the issue of delegation, see Polo and Tedeschi (2000),
where several results are shown to be robust to secret side-contracts.
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the optimal extent of delegation being µN = (A¡ c)=5 (see Vickers, 1985).
Now we are in a position to investigate the asymmetric case where …rm i
chooses to delegate while …rm j remains entrepreneurial and invests the amount
k in R&D.
At the second stage, the manager of …rm i maximises Mi (µ; k) = ¼i + µiqi
w.r.t. qi; while the owners of …rm j maximises ¼j (k; µ) = (p¡ bc) qj: Notice that
investment k is obviously irrelevant at this stage, as it does not enter …rms’ …rst
order conditions, which are:
@Mi
@qi
=A¡ 2qi ¡ qj ¡ c+ µi = 0 ; (6)
@¼j
@qj
=A¡ 2qj ¡ qi ¡ bc = 0 : (7)
Solving the system (6-7) yields optimal output levels:
qNi (µ; k) =
A¡ 2 (c¡ µi) + bc
3
; qNj (k; µ) =
A¡ 2bc+ c¡ µi
3
(8)
generating the following pro…ts:5
¼Ni (µ; k) =
(A¡ 2c+ bc)2
8
; ¼Nj (k; µ) =
(A+ 2c¡ 3bc)2
16
¡ k : (9)
Finally, we describe the case where …rm i’s stockholders both activate a cost-
reducing investment and delegate control to a manager. Firm j can, alternatively,
(i) remain entrepreneurial and reduce marginal cost to bc by investing k; (ii)
become managerial without investing in cost-reducing R&D; or (iii) replicate
…rm i’s behaviour.6
In case (i), we have:
¼Ni (kµ; k) =
(A¡ bc)2
8
¡ k ; ¼Nj (k; kµ) =
(A¡ bc)2
16
¡ k ; (10)
5The optimal extent of delegation for …rm i at the …rst stage is:
µ¤i =
A ¡ 2c + bc
4
6We omit the detailed illustration of calculations for the sake of brevity.
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where (kµ; k) indicates that …rm i is managerial and invests in R&D, while …rm
j is entrepreneurial and invests in R&D.
The relevant pro…ts in case (ii) are:
¼Ni (kµ; µ) =
2 (A+ 2c¡ 3bc)2
25
¡ k ; ¼Nj (µ; kµ) =
2 (A+ 2bc¡ 3c)2
25
: (11)
Equilibrium pro…ts in case (iii) are obviously as follows:
¼N (kµ; kµ) =
2 (A¡ bc)2
25
¡ k : (12)
This concludes the description of market subgames. In the following section, we
deal with stockholders’ decisions at the …rst stage of the game.
4 Stage I: The stockholders’ problem
Here we proceed in two steps. First, as an illustration, we consider the game where
cost-reducing R&D and delegation are mutually exclusive strategies (possibly due
to …nancial constraints). Then, we extend the analysis to allow for the possibility
of using both strategies jointly. We label the two cases as game I and game II,
respectively.
4.1 Game I
Using pro…ts (4), (5), and (9), we build matrix 1, yielding a reduced-form de-
scription of the …rst stage, where stockholders decide whether (i) to invest in
cost-reducing R&D while keeping with them the control of the …rm’s marketing
decision, or (ii) to delegate control to a manager while keeping unchanged the
…rm’s technology represented by marginal cost c.
2
k µ
1 k
(A¡ bc)2
9
¡ k ; (A¡ bc)2
9
¡ k (A+ 2c ¡ 3bc)2
16
¡ k ; (A¡ 2c+ bc)2
8
µ
(A¡ 2c+ bc)2
8
;
(A+ 2c¡ 3bc)2
16
¡ k 2 (A¡ c)
2
25
;
2 (A¡ c)2
25
Matrix 1
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The equilibrium outcome of the …rst stage of the game depends upon the sign
of:
¼N (µ; µ)¡ ¼N (k; µ) = 2 (A¡ c)
2
25
¡ (A+ 2c¡ 3bc)2
16
+ k (13)
and
¼N (µ; k)¡ ¼N (k; k) = (A¡ 2c+ bc)2
8
¡ (A¡ bc)2
9
+ k : (14)
Moreover, the additional information concerning the sign of
¼N (µ; µ)¡ ¼N (k; k) = 2 (A¡ c)
2
25
¡ (A¡ bc)2
9
+ k (15)
is relevant in order to establish whether the game is a prisoners’ dilemma, in case
the equilibrium outcome is symmetric and unique.
The solution of the game involves the evaluation of (13), (14) and (15) over
the parameter space fA; c; bc; kg : To obtain explicit solutions, we set A = 1; and
bc = 0; which involves no further loss of generality. This normalisation allows us
to plot conditions (13), (14) and (15) in the space fc; kg ; producing Figure 1.
Figure 1 : Equilibrium analysis. First stage, game I
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Notice that, for A = 1; and bc = 0; we have:
¼N (µ; µ)¡ ¼N (k; µ) > 0 if k > 4c(17c+ 41)¡ 7
400
´ k1 (16)
¼N (µ; k)¡ ¼N (k; k) > 0 if k > 36c(1¡ c)¡ 1
72
´ k2 (17)
¼N (µ; µ)¡ ¼N (k; k) > 0 if k > 18c(2¡ c) + 7
225
´ kpd (18)
where subscript pd in (18) stands for prisoners’ dilemma. Whenever a symmetric
equilibrium arises, condition (18) determines whether the game is a prisoners’
dilemma or not.
Without further discussion, we are now in a position to formulate the main
results of our analysis:
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium at the …rst stage can be characterised as
follows:
² In the parameter region A1, we have a prisoners’ dilemma with both stock-
holders playing their dominant strategy µ:
² In the parameter region A2, the unique Nash equilibrium is fµ; µg ; and is
also Pareto-e¢cient.
² In the parameter region A3, we have a chicken game with two Nash equi-
libria, fµ; kg and fk; µg :
² In the parameter region A4, we have a coordination game, with fk; kg Â
fµ; µg :
² In the parameter region A5, the unique Nash equilibrium is fk; kg ; and is
also Pareto-e¢cient.
² In the parameter region A6, we have a prisoners’ dilemma with both stock-
holders playing their dominant strategy k:
² In the parameter region A7, again we have a chicken game with two Nash
equilibria, fµ; kg and fk; µg :
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A few comments are now in order. First, the size of regions where at least
one …rm chooses to conduct R&D in equilibrium is increasing in the e¤ectiveness
of such activity, and decreasing in its cost, i.e., it is decreasing in both bc and k.
Second, when the stockholders’ menu includes two strategies leading to output
expansion (either due to a cost reduction through or to a perceived cost reduction
through delegation), then, in contrast with Vickers’s (1985) …ndings, delegation
is not necessarily a dominant strategy any more. Finally, even when delegation
is a dominant strategy, the associated equilibrium is not necessarily a prisoners’
dilemma. Indeed, in region A2, bilateral delegation is observed in a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome which is also Pareto-optimal.
4.2 Game II
Now we extend the stockholders’ perspective, to account for the possibility of
activating R&D investments for process innovation and separating ownership
from control. The issue at stake is whether the joint use of delegation and cost-
reducing investments is necessarily going to be observed at equilibrium. The
reduced form of the game is represented by matrix 2.
2
k µ kµ
k
(A¡bc)2
9
¡ k; (A¡bc)2
9
¡ k (A+2c¡3bc)2
16
¡ k; (A¡2c+bc)2
8
(A¡bc)2
16
¡ k; (A¡bc)2
8
¡ k
1 µ (
A¡2c+bc)2
8
;
(A+2c¡3bc)2
16
¡ k 2(A¡c)2
25
; 2(A¡c)
2
25
2(A+2bc¡3c)2
25
;
2(A+2c¡3bc)2
25
¡ k
kµ
(A¡bc)2
8
¡ k; (A¡bc)2
16
¡ k 2(A+2c¡3bc)2
25
¡ k; 2(A+2bc¡3c)2
25
2(A¡bc)2
25
¡ k; 2(A¡bc)2
25
¡ k
Matrix 2
First, notice that strategy kµ strictly dominates strategy k for all bc 2 [0; c):
The intuition behind this result is the following. Since in these two cases …rms
operate cost-reducing investments independently of whether they are managerial
or entrepreneurial, the choice between these strategies depends upon the prof-
itability of delegation in a game with symmetric marginal costs. Hence, exactly
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as in Vickers (1985), there emerges that delegation is a dominant strategy, all
else equal.
Therefore, the game reduces to a 2£ 2 matrix de…ned by strategies µ and kµ:
The equilibrium behaviour of …rms depends upon the following conditions:
¼N (µ; µ)¡ ¼N (kµ; µ) > 0 if k > 6 (2A+ c¡ 3bc) (c¡ bc)
25
´ k3 (19)
¼N (µ; kµ)¡ ¼N (kµ; kµ) > 0 if k > 6 (2A¡ 3c+ bc) (c¡ bc)
25
´ k4 (20)
The prisoners’ dilemma condition writes as follows:
¼N (µ; µ)¡ ¼N (kµ; kµ) > 0 if k > 2 (2A¡ c¡ bc) (c¡ bc)
25
´ k0pd (21)
Once again, w.l.o.g. we set A = 1; and bc = 0; which involves no further loss
of generality. This allows us to plot conditions (19), (20) and (21) in the space
fc; kg ; yielding Figure 2.
Figure 2 : Equilibrium analysis. First stage, game II
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The inspection of Figure 2 produces the following:
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Proposition 2 The Nash equilibrium at the …rst stage can be characterised as
follows:
² In the parameter region B1, the unique Nash equilibrium is fµ; µg ; and is
also Pareto-e¢cient.
² In the parameter region B2, we have a chicken game with two Nash equilib-
ria, fkµ; µg and fµ; kµg :
² In the parameter region B3, we have a prisoners’ dilemma with both stock-
holders playing their dominant strategy kµ:
² In the parameter region B4, the unique Nash equilibrium is fkµ; kµg ; and
is also Pareto-e¢cient.
² In the parameter region B5, we have a chicken game with two Nash equilib-
ria, fkµ; µg and fµ; kµg :
Hence, game II always entails managerialization, while allowing for asymmet-
ric behaviour concerning R&D activity. Under this respect, it is worth noting
that parameter regions B2 and B5 yield equilibria where …rms’ perceived tech-
nologies are asymmetric both because of asymmetric delegation contracts and
because of unilateral R&D investments. This is an example of a situation where
ex ante symmetric …rms (i.e., both managerial) have asymmetric incentives to-
wards process innovation.7 Finally, there exists a parameter region (B1) where
neither …rm conducts R&D in equilibrium, as the investment is too costly. In
this case, unlike game I, the equilibrium outcome fµ; µg is Pareto-e¢cient.
5 Concluding remarks
The acquired wisdom on strategic delegation maintains that separating ownership
from control is a dominant strategy (Fershtman, 1985; Vickers, 1985; Fershtman
7Asymmetric R&D races have received relatively little attention in the existing literature.
A relevant exception is Delbono and Denicolò (1991).
11
and Judd, 1987, inter alia). However, this literature has not assessed the inter-
play among delegation and other strategies that a …rm might adopt to achieve a
dominant market position.
Process innovation through R&D is one such activity. In a simple Cournot
duopoly with homogeneous goods, we have investigated the relative pro…tability
of delegation versus cost-reducing R&D investment, …nding that delegation does
not always emerge as the equilibrium strategy. Then, we have extended the analy-
sis to allow for the possibility of using delegation and cost-reducing R&D jointly.
In this case, there emerges that the use of R&D investment by entrepreneur-
ial …rms is a dominated strategy, so that …rms always separate ownership from
control, while they don’t necessarily combine delegation with process innovation.
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